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INSIGHTS INTO SOVIET TREATY PRACTICE: THE SECRET
SOVIET-GRENADIAN MILITARY AGREEMENTS OF 1980-1982
DIETRICH ANDRk LOEBER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

History shows that we have to wait for the collapse of a Soviet
treaty partner to learn more about Soviet treaty practice. Only then do
we gain access to those agreements concluded by the Soviet Union
which are carefully shielded from the outside world. The fall of the
(non-Soviet) government of Georgia, in 1921, is an early example;1 the
surrender of Germany in 1945 a later one;2 and the latest is
the disinte3
gration of the Socialist government in Grenada, in 1983.
Although many countries presumably conclude secret agreements,
the Soviet Union prides itself in engaging in open diplomacy only. This
claim is based on the Soviet Decree of Peace, issued by the young Soviet Republic and signed by Lenin one day after the October Revolution in 1917. The Decree of Peace provides that "[t]he Government
abolishes secret diplomacy and on its part expresses the firm intention4
to carry on all negotiations absolutely openly before all the people."
As the case of Grenada shows, the Soviet Union did not live up to its
*

Professor of Law, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany.
1. After the fall of the non-Soviet Government of Georgia, the Soviet Union published the text of a secret supplement to the Peace Treaty of 1920, between the RSFSR
and Georgia. 3 SBORNIK DEISTVUIUSHCHIKH DOGOVORov RSFSR 295 (1922), English
translation in 1 SoVwET TREATY SERIES 46 (L. Shapiro ed. 1950). See also infra note 64
and accompanying text.
2. The archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs contains the text of the
Secret Protocol to the Soviet-German Treaty of Non-Aggression of 1939, English translation in 2 SOVIET TREATY SERIES, supra note 1, at 208-09; NAZI-SovIET RELATIONS 19391941, at 78, 105-107 (R.J. Sontag ed. 1948); 3 SovIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY 36061, 378-79 (J. Degras ed. 1953). See infra note 65.
3. A selection of documents captured by United States troops in Grenada in October,
1983 has been released by the United States Department of State and Department of
Defense in GRENADA DOCUMENTS: AN OVERVIEW AND SELECTION (1984) [hereinafter GRENADA DOCUMENTS]. Soon after a private collection of documents appeared, see THE GRENADA PAPERS (P. Seabury & W.A. McDougall eds. 1984) [hereinafter GRENADA PAPERS].
For other publications by the United States Department of State and Department of
Defense see GRENADA, A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1983); Maurice Bishop's "Line of March"
Speech, Sept. 13, 1983 (1984); LESSONS OF GRENADA (1986).
4. Decree of Peace of November 8, 1917 English translation in THE SOVIET UNION
AND PEACE 22-25 (1930).
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commitment.
The purpose of this article is to provide some insight into Soviet
treaty practice, using three secret Soviet-Grenadian military agreements as a case study. These agreements were concluded between 1980
and 1982, during the short-lived regime of the left-wing government of
Grenada, established in 1979 and headed by Maurice Bishop.
In view of the mushrooming literature on Grenada and the United
States mission of 1983,5 there is no need for an extensive history of this
Caribbean island, discovered by Columbus in 1498 and now inhabited
by some 111,000 people. Grenada won independence from Great Britain in 1974, and in 1979 it established diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union. s Shortly thereafter a network of bilateral treaties with
the Soviet Union developed. Two of them were published: a commercial agreement of 1980 and an agreement on cultural cooperation
dated 1982.8 The first one was supplemented by a Protocol of 1980 on
the sale of Soviet equipment on credit, at an interest rate of four percent.' During a visit to Moscow in 1982, Premier Maurice Bishop
signed an agreement on economic and technological cooperation, a protocol on the delivery of goods for 1983-1987, and a consular convention. 0 Although these agreements were reported in the press, the three
secret treaties discussed here were not mentioned in any open publications until their texts were released in the United States in 1983.
In addition to the state-to-state agreements, the ruling parties of
5. See, e.g., W. GILMORE, THE GRENADA INTERVENTION: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION
(1984); U. KRAFrr, DER FALL GRENADA (1984); J. MoORE, LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION
(1984); H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, GRENADA. REVOLUTION, INVASION AND AFTERMATH (1984); A.
PAYNE, GRENADA: REVOLUTION AND INVASION (1984); in the Soviet Union, see GRENADA
TERRORIZM SSHA v DEISTVII (1983). I. GVOZDEZ, GRENADA: U.S. TERRORISM IN ACTION:
DOCUMENTS, FACTS, COMMENTS (1983); B. KALIAGINA & D. POGORZHELSKII, VCHERA
V'ETNAM, LAOS, KAMPUCHIIA, SEGODNIA, GRENADA, LIVAN, ZAVTRA (1985). For the international law aspects of the United States mission, see Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984); and from a Soviet perspective, see
Lazarev, Grenada: Razboi Vmesto Prava, LATINSKAIA AMERIKA No. 3 at 135 (1984).

6.

Communique

of

1979,

DEISTVUIUSHCHIKH DOGOVOROV

7.

36

Izvestia,

Sept.

13,

1979

quoted

in

35

SBORNIK

SSSR 33 (1981).

SBORNIK DEISTVUIUSHCHIKH DOGOVOROV

SSSR 121-24 (1981);

SOBRANIE POSTA-

NOVLENII SSSR, Part 2 No. 4, item 19 (1981) [hereinafter SP SSSR].

8.
9.

2 SOBRANIE POSTANOVLENII SSSR No. 10, item 22 (1983).
GRENADA DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, at 21-22. For further economic agreements, see

Duncan, Grenada, in 1982 YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS 104 [hereinafter COMMUNIST YEARBOOK 1982]; Duncan, Grenada in 1983 YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS 93 [hereinafter COMMUNIST YEARBOOK 1983]; Duncan, Grenada, in 1984 YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS 128 [hereinafter
COMMUNIST YEARBOOK 1984].

10.

Soviet News, Aug. 4, 1982, at 251.
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the two countries also entered into treaty-type relations. In an Agreement of 1982, the parties declared their intention to cooperate "at all
levels" and in various fields, including consultations on the world revolutionary process, the promotion of inter-state relations and the training of party and government cadres." The document, signed for the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) by Boris N. Ponomarev12 and for the New Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education,
and Liberation (JEWEL) Movement by Kenrick Radix", was to be
supplemented periodically by "concrete plans." A plan agreed upon in
the Fall of 1982 provided for the construction of headquarters for the
New JEWEL Movement (NJM) in St. George's, the capital of Grenada. The CPSU agreed to bear the costs while the Communist Party
of Cuba was to supply the materials. 4 Work had not yet begun when
the NJM disintegrated in 1983. Another part of the plan envisaged
scholarships for "15 NJM comrades" to attend the CPSU Party
School. A program administered by the CPSU included visits to the
Soviet Union based on annual quotas in man/month units. The New
JEWEL Movement was invited to send to the Soviet Union five participants for "rest and recreation" and "familiarization.""5

II. THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF THE MILITARY AID AGREEMENTS
A.

Format of the Agreements

The agreements can be listed briefly in chronological order:
(i) The first agreement was concluded in Havana on October 27,
1980 [1980 Agreement]. It consists of 7 articles to which a "[1]ist of
special materiel . . . " (sic) is appended. 6
11. GRENADA PAPERS, supra note 3, at 45-46, 230-31.
12. Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev is Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and,
since 1954, chief of its International Department.
13. Kenrick Radix, then the Minister of Legal Affairs, also was a member of the New
JEWEL Movement Politburo and the NJM Central Committee. In October, 1982, his
political work was criticized and he apparently lost his membership in the NJM Central
Committee. Mr. Radix, however, survived the events of October, 1983. GRENADA PAPERS,
supra note 3, at 15; Note, Chronology of the Grenada Crisis, 3 COMMUNIST AFFAMRS 290,
293, 296 (1984); Faerron, Chronology of Events, CARRIBBEAN REV., July 1983, at 10, 13;
Diederich, Interviewing George Louison, CARRIBBEAN REV., July 1983, at 17, 18; MAURICE
BISHOP SPEAKS XXVII, XXIX (B. Marcus et al, eds. 1984). Cf. A report by Kenrick
Radix (ABC News, May 30, 1985 Show 523 No. 20/20 at 5).
14. GRENADA DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, Doc. 29-3.
15.
See id. Doc. 21-3; Docs. 26-7, 26-8. See also id. Doc. 29-2 and Minutes of the
NJM Politburo of Sept. 15, 1982, as summarized in a memo by Hazel-Ann dated Oct. 4,
1982. A copy of this memo is on file with the United States Department of State, Washington D.C.
16. Id. Doc. 13. It is conceivable that the Soviet representative had arrived in Havana
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(ii) Three months later a Protocol of February 9, 1981 was signed
in Havana [1981 Protocol]. The Protocol has only 3 articles, but it is
supplemented by a list of eighty-four items of special equipment. 7
(iii) The third agreement was concluded one and a half years
later, on July 27, 1982, in Moscow [1982 Agreement]. It is the most
comprehensive of the three treaties, consisting of eight articles and two
annexes. The first annex lists fifty-six items of equipment to be delivered to the Grenadian army, while the second annex provides for the
supply of forty-seven items of equipment to the Grenadian Ministry of
the Interior."s
All three agreements are drafted in both English and Russian,
each text being equally valid; and although they conform to the usual
format of international agreements, each is marked "Top secret." The
agreements are preceded by an almost identical preamble and are
closed by a sentence indicating the place and the date they were executed. The final language (that is "For and on behalf of the Government of . . . ") is signed by one representative for each of the contracting parties, but the representatives are not identified by name or
position.
The 1982 Agreement was to be executed on the basis of "contracts" (art. 6). One such contract, marked "secret," was concluded
four months later in Moscow [1982 Contract]."
B.

Release of the Texts

The texts of the three agreements, together with other captured
documents, were released to the public by the United States State Department in 1983. One year later, a selection of the captured documents was published by both the United States State Department and
the Department of Defense. Although the author is unable to verify the
authenticity of the documents, there is no doubt as to their genuiness.
in connection with the signing of a Soviet-Cuban economic agreement on Nov. 1, 1980.
17.
Id. Doc. 15. On October 6, 1981, prior to the signing of the 1981 Protocol, Marshall Nikolai V. Ogarkov, who was then the Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy
Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, arrived in Havana with a "high-ranking military delegation." Pravada, Feb. 9, 1981; Granma, Feb. 15, 1981. Perhaps an official in
Ogarkov's delegation acted as the Soviet representative in signing the 1981 Protocol with
Grenada.
18. Id. Doc. 14. The 1982 Agreement was signed in Moscow at the time Premier Maurice Bishop concluded the open economic agreement. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
19. Contract No. 84/2100602 (Nov. 26, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Contract] entered into
by the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and the Grenadian Ministry of Defense, is on file with the United States Department of State.
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The Soviet Union failed to react to the publication, by the United
States Government, of the secret Soviet-Grenadian agreements. In the
flood of Soviet publications condemning the 1983 U.S. mission in Grenada, the documents captured by the U.S. forces were passed over in
silence. P.P. Iakovlev, in 1984, mentioned "allegedly 'secret documents'
which fell into the hands of the U.S.A. and which were published by
the U.S. government." However, Iakovlev explained that they dealt
with "agreements between the government of Cuba and Grenada,"
thus creating the impression that none of the captured documents related to the Soviet Union.2"
C.

Substance of the Agreements

Without analyzing in detail the agreements and describing, for instance, the individual items to be shipped to Grenada, the obligations
undertaken by the Soviet Union can be grouped into four categories:
(i) delivery of equipment for military use and for use by the Ministry
of Interior; (ii) training of Grenadian military personnel in the Soviet
Union; (iii) sending of Soviet specialists to Grenada; and (iv) keeping
the agreements secret.
i. Arms Transfer
The military equipment to be sent to Grenada consisted of a wide
range of items:
Armaments-from anti-aircraft mounts and military guns
to armored personnel carriers and armored reconnaissance
vehicles;
Small arms-from rifles and pistols to grenade launchers
and anti-tank guns;
Ammunition-cartridges, grenades and mines;
Uniforms and equipment-from undershirts, belts and
boots to blankets, pots and binoculars;
Vehicles-jeeps, trucks and ambulances;
Communication equipment, such as radio stations and
telephone sets;
Logistic material-from camp tents and camouflage nets
to a mobile kitchen, including messes and a bakery plant;
Engineering equipment-from mine detectors and excavators to bulldozers and a power station.
The equipment for use by the Ministry of the Interior included
20. Iakovlev, in

TRAGEDUA GRENADY

118 (1984).
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"special instrumentation," such as "Pobedit-M," "Moshka-MX," "Nylon-ZU"-apparently equipment needed for counter-intelligence and
surveillance purposes. The Soviet Union also agreed to supply signalling systems, infrared viewers, videotapes, tape recorders and photo
cameras.
The value of deliveries for military and civilian use is fixed in the
three agreements at a total of 19.4 million rubles, but all deliveries
were to be "free of charge." The time of delivery was scheduled for
1980-1981 (1980 Agreement), 1981-1983 (1981 Protocol) and 1982-1985
(1982 Agreement). The place of delivery was to be a port in Cuba. The
equipment was to be delivered by the Soviet Union by sea.
Grenada assumed the obligation not to sell or transfer the equipment to third parties without the consent of the Soviet Union. Grenada also undertook not to permit the equipments use by a third
party. Apparently the Soviet Union was content with a promise and
did not insist on a mechanism to ensure the ban, by demanding an
"end-use certificate" from Grenada or other means to guarantee the
end-use requirement.
The Soviet Union seems to have performed its part of the agreements. Most of the deliveries, due in 1983, had already been supplied
by April 1983, as Grenadian officials were told in Moscow."1
Military Training of Foreign Nationals

ii.

The Soviet Union undertook to render technical assistance by receiving Grenadian servicemen for training in the USSR. The purpose
of the training was to teach the Grenadians how to use the Soviet
equipment. The costs were to be borne by the Soviet Union and included: "training, upkeep, meals in Soviet military educational establishments," and round trip travel from Grenada to the USSR. The servicemen, however, were "deputed" for training "without their
families." The "detailed terms" of receiving the Grenadians were to be
stipulated by contract.
iii.

Sending Military Specialists Abroad

Under the 1982 Agreement, the Soviet Union agreed to send Soviet specialists to Grenada. Although the detailed terms again were to
be stipulated in contracts, the basic rules defining the status and the
privileges of the specialists were specified in the 1982 Agreement itself,
and, consequently, they were not negotiable. The Soviet specialists
were to enjoy immunity from taxes and duties, and they were to be
21.

GRENADA DOCUMENTS,

supra note 3, Docs. 24-3, 30-4.
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provided free medical service, "comfortable, furnished living accommodations," including municipal utilities and transportation facilities at
no cost. In addition, they were to be ensured "meals at reasonable
prices at the places of their residence." All other expenses, including
travel to and from the USSR, were to be borne by the Soviet Union.
The secret 1982 Contract was concluded with execution of the 1982
Agreement. The contract listed seven categories of specialists to be deputed from the USSR to Grenada, each for fifteen days. Grenada in
turn was obliged to provide the Soviet Union with lists indicating
"suitably furnished living accommodations . . . equipped with air-conditioners." Such arrangement can be compared with earlier Soviet
practices.22 At the time of the United States invasion of Grenada in
1983, forty nine Soviet specialists were on the island.2
The issue of the status of Soviet technicians in Grenada arose also
in connection with a "satellite dish station" to be financed by the Soviet Union.2 4 Although this project was viewed by the Soviet side as
"the centerpiece of the July 1982 agreements," it was not signed by
Grenada for almost a year; a fact which the Grenadian ambassador to
Moscow deplored. In a confidential report of July 1983, the Grenadian
ambassador noted that the question of how to house, transport and
pay Soviet technicians was still "negotiable," whereas the other items
were fixed.2 5 The delay may perhaps have been an indication of the
difficulties the Grenadian government experienced with respect to
privileges sought by the Soviets for specialists in Grenada.
iv.

Secrecy Clause

Both governments pledged to keep secret not only the "terms of
the deliveries," but also "all . . . information connected with the implementation" of the agreements. Although the secrecy clause does not
expressly refer to the training of Grenadian servicemen in the Soviet
Union or the sending of Soviet specialists to Grenada, one may assume
that these parts of the agreements were to be treated confidentially
because they constituted "information connected with the implementation" of the agreements.
22. See, e.g., art. 18 of the General Conditions for Technical Assistance included in
an Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation between the USSR and Guinea
in 1960, reprintedin French in G. ZENZ, SOWJETISCHE ENTWICKLUNGSHILFE: ORGANISATION
UND VERTRAGSRECT H T 111-17 (1970).
23. COMMUNIST YEARBOOK 1984, supra note 9, at 128.
24. Letter from General Hudson Austin to the USSR Ministry of Communications
(Feb. 17, 1982) (on file with the United States Department of State). See id.
25. GRENADA DocuMENTs, supra note 3, Doc. 26-3.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS

The substance of these three, self-executing military agreements
raises several issues under international law, including the question of
whether the agreements have lost their force since the collapse of the
NJM government, in 1983.
A.

Arms Transfer

The UN Charter prohibits the use or threat of force.2 6 It also provides for measures in case of a threat to peace.27 In view of these rules,
which are an expression of general principles of international law, the
question is whether arms transfers are in conformity with international
law. Arms transfers are in conformity because the above principles outlaw the use of arms for aggressive purposes, but they do not restrict
the transfer of arms generally. Attempts to regulate or restrict the international traffic in arms in multilateral or bilateral treaties have not

yielded any concrete results to date.2 8 There have been cases in inter-

national practice, however, when states have protested the sale of arms
to countries considered by them to be hostile. The Chinese protest of
British arms sales to Taiwan provides an example.
The right to transfer arms, however, is affected by the neutrality
principle. Neutrality forbids any military support of a belligerent
power. The shipment of arms to a state at war amounts to such support and constitutes a violation of the international law of neutrality,
as embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907.29 The Soviet Union

formally declared, in 1955, that she was bound by these Conventions.
The Soviet-Grenadian military agreements do not address the obligations to Grenada in the event that Grenada becomes involved in a
war. In view of the binding character of the law of neutrality, there was
no need to repeat its principles in th6 agreements. Nevertheless, the
obligations of the parties must be judged in light of the law of neutrality. Considering the unstable political situation in the Caribbean Basin
and Central America, and the militant posture of the New JEWEL
Movement in Grenada, on the one hand, and the Soviet arms delivery
schedule extending over a period of six years (1980-1985), on the other
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
27. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41, 42.
28. The League of Nations Convention on Arms Sales of 1925 was not ratified. The
Conventional Arms Transfer talks held between the USSR and the United States from
1977 to 1979 also did not produce an agreement. See Delbrtick, International Traffic in
Arms, 24 W.G.Y.B. INT'L L. 114-43 (1981).
29. Note of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 1955, Izvestiia, Mar. 9, 1955,
reprintedin 2 MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO V IZBRANNYKH DOKUMENTAKH 247 (1957).
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hand, the potential impact of the law of neutrality on the agreements
is not merely of academic importance.
B. Military Training of Foreign Nationals
The military training of foreign nationals is not prohibited under
international law. Such training, however, can constitute a violation if
the military personnel are trained for the purpose of a violent overthrow of another government or for conducting military operations
against another state. Such activities are frequently termed subversive
or terrorist, and are prohibited by the rule of non-intervention. 0 In
addition, these activities often constitute a violation of the duty to re3
frain from the use or threat of force. 1
Generally states engaged in the training of foreign personnel are
careful to demonstrate that such activity is in compliance with international law. These states try to avoid any appearance of impropriety by
explicitly stating that their dealings relate to lawful purposes. The
Friendship Agreement between the Soviet Union and the United Arab
Republic (UAR) of 1971 serves as an illustration.3 s The Agreement
provides "for assistance in the training of UAR military personnel and
in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the UAR."
The Agreement declares that the assistance is given in order that the
UAR might eliminate "the consequences of aggression," a clear reference to the Israeli-Egyptian War of 1967. Furthermore, the assistance
is intended to increase the ability of the UAR "to stand up to aggression in general."3 3 The wording used indicates that the parties were
careful to stay within the limits, imposed by international law, which
outlaw aggression but permit self-defense.
The Soviet-Grenadian agreements do not contain any reference to
external threats to or outside aggression of Grenada. The agreements
merely speak of a desire to promote strengthening the independence of
Grenada. 3 4 It is also significant that the Soviet-Grenadian agreements
were marked top secret, whereas the Soviet-UAR Agreement was
published.
30. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 12, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
32. See 10 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 836-38 (1971) [hereinafter I.L.M.].
33. Id. art. 8. Five years later, Egypt gave notice to terminate the treaty, effective in
1977. G. GINSBURGS & R. SLUSSER, A CALENDAR OF SovIET TREATIES 1958-1973, at 601
(1981).
34. See Preamble of 1980 Agreement, GRENADA DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, Doc. 13-1,
and Preamble of 1982 Agreement, GRENADA DOCUMENTS, id. Doc. 14-1.
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Sending Military Specialists Abroad

Sending military specialists abroad is a common element in programs for military assistance to Third World countries. Because the
practice is permitted under international law, it is used frequently by
states, including the Soviet Union. The limitations imposed by international law are derived, as in the case of the military training of foreign
nationals, 5 from the prohibition of intervention and from the duty to
refrain from the use or threat of force.3
D. Secrecy Clause
United Nations member states have agreed to register their international agreements with the United Nations Secretariat, who then
publishes them. This rule, now embodied in article 102 of the United
Nations Charter and confirmed in article 80 of the Vienna Convention,"7 has its historical roots in article 18 of the League of Nations
Covenant.38 The Soviet Union takes credit for the rule in the Covenant, claiming that the institution of the registration requirement owes
its origin to the Soviet Government's renunciation of secret diplomacy,
a policy proclaimed one day after the October Revolution in 1917.3'
Although the League of Nations rule decreed that no international
agreement is binding unless it is registered, the United Nation's Charter is more cautious. It merely stipulates that no treaty partner may
invoke an international agreement before a United Nation's organ unless the agreement is registered.4 Failure to live up to the duty of registering an agreement, however, does not affect its validity under international law. There is no generally recognized rule of international law
that imposes an obligation on partners of international agreements to
publish those agreements. The fact that the three Soviet-Grenadian
35. See supra note 30.
36. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; Definition of Agression, as approved by U.N. Res.
3314 (XXIX) of Dec. 1974, reprinted in I.L.M. 588 (1975), as drafted by Special Committee on the Definition of Aggression, Report of Working Group, reprintedin 13 I.L.M.
710 (1974); Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act of 1975.
37. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, 63 A.J.I.L. 875 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention], reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
38. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 18.
39. Kozhevnikov, Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo I Mezhdunarodnye, 1 UcHErYE ZAPIsKI 80,
92 (1947). See also J. TRisKA & R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW AND POLICY OF SovIEr
TRFmrIs 88-89 (1962); N. MIRONOV, in SovETSKui EZHEGODNIK MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA
35 (1980) (English summary at 37-40).
40. For Soviet literature on the duty to publish international agreements, see A.
TALALAEv, MEZHDUNARODNYE DOGOVORY V SOVREMENNON MIRE 98 (1973); A. TALALAEv,
ZAKON 0 MEZHDUNARODNYKH DOGOVORAKH SSSR NA SLUZHBE MIRA 60-61 (1979).
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military agreements are secret, therefore, does not make them invalid
under international law. It is another question whether the national
law of the USSR imposes a duty to publish the agreements.
E.

Termination of Agreements

The disintegration of the People's Revolutionary Government of
Grenada in October, 1983 raises the question of the continuing legal
validity of the three agreements. To date, neither of the contracting
parties has publicly withdrawn from the agreements or has given notice of their termination. The events of October, 1983 in Grenada, however, have fundamentally changed the circumstances upon which the
three agreements were based. Consequently, it can be argued that the
agreements have lost their legal force, even without a formal notification by either or both of the contracting parties.
This conclusion follows from the clausula rebus sic stantibus doctrine, a generally recognized principle of international law, which has
been incorporated into the Vienna Convention through the Law of
Treaties of 1969.41 The Vienna Convention is seen as a codification of
existing international law and not as an instrument creating new international law. Although the Soviet Union did not ratify the Vienna
Convention, the Soviets are, nevertheless, bound by those elements of
the Convention which constitute general international law.
F.

Conclusion

It can be stated in conclusion that the three agreements under discussion are valid under international law. The fact that they were secret or that their substance dealt with military assistance does not affect their validity. Doubts as to their conformity with international
law, stem from the objectives which the agreements are to serve. Only
if one of the objectives is the commission of aggressive acts, would the
agreements violate international law.
IV.

SOVIET LAW ASPECTS

Soviet treaty-making power is regulated by statute. Such legislation, however, does not reveal which agencies are charged with drafting
and implementing military assistance agreements. Significantly, the
Soviet-Grenadian agreements shed light on the internal aspects of Soviet treaty-making practice as well as on some legal techniques in the
execution of international agreements.
41.

Vienna Convention, supra note 37.
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Soviet Agencies Administering Agreements of Military
Assistance

The formulae concluding the three agreements refer solely to the
"Government" of each of the contracting partners, but do not indicate
which agency, in fact, is acting for the government. Moreover, the signatures of the Soviet representatives on two agreements are illegible
and do not permit identification."2 The signature of the Soviet representative on the third agreement reads "M. Sergeichik." It appears
that in 1982, when this agreement was signed, Mikhail Alekseyevich
Sergeichik was the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (known under the Russian abbreviation GKES). 4- One year later, M. Sergeichik received an official
of the Grenadian Embassy in Moscow for talks on the implementation
of the agreements. In the Grenadian minutes of the meeting,
Sergeichik is identified as a Colonel General and as the First Deputy
Chairman of GKES.4 4 There can be little doubt that the signer of the
1982 Agreement and the GKES official are one and the same person.
The Soviet Grenadian agreements, therefore, reveal that Soviet military assistance to Third World countries is administered by GKES.
Ordinarily, such conduct is reflected in the enabling statute of the
agency. The statute of GKES, however, has not been published. A few
excerpts of its 1958 statute appeared in a Soviet bulletin which is not
available through commercial channels. 45 According to the excerpts,
GKES is authorized to present proposals to the Soviet government for
the delivery of equipment to developing countries. 46 It also has the
right to provide industrial-technical training for specialists from developing countries and to dispatch Soviet specialists for rendering techni42. The United States Department of State has not been able to identify the names
and positions of the Soviet representatives. Letter from the United States Department of
State to Dietrich Andr6 Loeber (Nov. 26, 1984).

43. 1981 DIRECTORY OF SOVIET OFFICIALS: NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A REFERENCE
188; 1982 DIRECTORY OF SOVIET OFFICIALS: NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A REFERENCE
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163. GKES, formed after a reorganization in 1957, was run initially by M. Pervukhin
(1957-1958), and then by S. Skachkov (1958-1983), who retired at the age of 76. The next
chairman was Y. Ryabov (1983-1984). See infra text accompanying notes 80-82 for information on Ryabov's successor, M.A. Sergeichik. For material on GKES, see Shillinglaw &
Stein, Doing Business in the Soviet Union, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 35-37 (1981);
ZENZ. supra note 22, at 23-24; V. VASSILEV, POLICY IN THE SovIET BLOC ON AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 31 (1970). See supra note 20 for a GKES contract with Grenada.
44. GRENADA DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, Doc. 30-3.
45. BIULLETEN' TEKUSHCHEGO ZAKONODATEL'STVA 9-14 (Jan. 1958). For the English

translation, see
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cal assistance abroad.4 7 The text, however, gives no hint that the powers of GKES include military assistance. A Soviet author describing
of GKES in 1983 does not provide such information
the functions
8
4

either.

Grenadian internal documents, captured by United States troops
in Grenada in 1983, throw some light on the work of GKES. Particularly revealing are the memoranda of Grenadian Minister-Counsellor in
Moscow, Bernard Bourne, summarizing the above-mentioned meeting
with representatives of GKES, 9 and a letter discussing a meeting with
Marshall N.V. Ogarkov,50 then Chief of the Soviet General Staff in
Moscow. These documents allow some glimpses into the division of
competence between GKES and other Soviet agencies, and the procedures these agencies followed.
1. Administrative Competence
Military aid in the form of providing armaments is the responsibility of GKES. Two of its departments are involved in military projects:
The Main Technical Department (in Russian, Glavnoe tekhnicheskoe
upravlenie or GTU) and the Main Engineering Department (in Russian, Glavnoe inzhenernoe upravlenie or GIU). Although neither department's name suggests its true function, it is the Engineering Department that seems primarily responsible for projects of a military
nature. 1 The Engineering Department's Deputy Chief, who took part
in the meeting with the Grenadian diplomats at GKES, has the rank of
Rear Admiral. One of his subordinates, a section chief, is listed as a
Colonel.
The GKES shares its competence with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, which handles transport and delivery of fuel, spare parts
and food in connection with any military project. The ministry thus
provides those services and products that are part of its regular activities in the civilian sector.
The USSR Ministry of Defense is apparently only involved in the
military policy implications of aid arrangements, leaving the procurement side to GKES and the commercial side to the Soviet Foreign
Trade Ministry. In one instance, however, the Ministry of Defense is
47.

Id.

48.

IW'in D., in

323-25 (1979). Cf.

UPRAVLNIE
ZENZ,

V OBLASTI ADMINISTRATIVNO-POLITICHESKOI

supra note 22, at 23-24.

49.

GRENADA DOCUMENTS,

50.
51.

Id. Doc. 24-1.
Id. Docs. 30-2; 30-4.

supra note 3, Docs. 30-3, 30-4, 30-5.
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said to have delivered spare parts to Genada directly. 2 This, perhaps,
was done to cut through some red tape in a case of urgent need.
2.

Administrative Procedures

Prime Minister Bishop made a request for military and civilian
equipment in a letter to Chairman Tikhonov, of the Soviet Council of
Ministers, in July, 1982.2 The steps taken by Grenada to follow up on
this request help elucidate Soviet bureaucratic procedures in the area
of military aid programs.
Bishop's request for aid drew no response for seven months. When
the Grenadian Embassy in Moscow finally made inquiries, it was told
by Marshall Ogarkov that the request of the Prime Minister "was
under consideration" by the competent bodies, that is by GKES and
the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade. Ogarkov added, however, that
the USSR Ministry of Defense would also "exercise some control on
the solution." Six weeks later, the Grenadian Embassy in Moscow used
the opportunity of a meeting with the GKES officials to present copies
of request letters the Embassy had recently sent to the Ministry of
Defense, hoping to speed up the decision-making process 4
The Grenadians apparently found it difficult to overcome the
usual bureaucratic hurdles and gain access to decision-making bodies.
Two chance remarks in a Grenadian report illustrate this frustration. A
Grenadian diplomat thanked GKES for arranging a meeting "at short
notice," indicating that he regarded it as a favor. Later in the conversation, he requested GKES to arrange a meeting with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, probably assuming that a telephone call from
GKES would be more effective than his own effort." After the Soviet
authorities finally granted some of the Grenadian requests in April,
1983, they suggested signing the contract in Moscow rather than in St.
George's. 56 Subsequent events, however, prevented a realization of the
proposal.
B. Execution of InternationalAgreements by Contract
The 1982 Agreement was supplemented by a "Contract." The format of the document is similar to contracts used by Soviet foreign
trade organizations, and suggests a transaction of a civil law character.
Contract No. 84/2100602 identifies the parties as "supplier" and "cus52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Doc.
Doc.
Doc.
Doc.
Doc.

30-4.
24-3.
30-4.
30-3, 30-5.
30-5.
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tomer" and records their "legal addresses." In substance, the contract
stipulates obligations of the parties of a civil law character, as well as
of an administrative law character. For instance, the customer not only
shall provide living accomodations 7 and pay for the transportation of
material within the territory of Grenada 8s but shall also guarantee the
safety of the Soviet specialists in Grenada.5 These obligations are also
binding under international law. Classified as "[s]ecret," the contract is
a complex legal document which does not easily fit into textbook categories of Soviet law.
C. Publicationof InternationalAgreements
The demand for open diplomacy, proclaimed in the Decree of
Peace of 1917, has its history in the writings of Lenin. Lenin castigated
the Provisional Government of Russia in 1917 for refusing to publish
the secret treaties concluded by the Imperial Russian Government.
Lenin named in particular the "predatory" treaties of Russia with England and France, which were entered into with the aim of conquering
Constantinople, and taking Armenia from Turkey and Galicia from
Austria. Lenin also demanded the publication of a 1915 treaty between
Russia and Italy which required the Allied powers to turn over South
Tyrol to Italy." One day after coming to power in 1917, Lenin reminded the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets that the "secret
treaties must be published." 61 Two months later, Lenin repeated his
demand in an appeal to the Constituent Assembly. 2 Within a few
years, the Soviet government did, indeed, publish the secret treaties
that Lenin had named and other documents as well.6 8
At the same time, however, the Soviet government began its own
practice of withholding certain agreements from publication. One early
example is a supplement to the 1920 Peace Treaty with the non-Soviet
government of Georgia. In the supplement, the Georgian Government,
under Soviet pressure, agreed to give the Georgian Communist Party
full freedom of action without the threat of "judicial or administrative
57.
58.
59.
60.

1982 Contract, supra note 19, art. 3.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 5.
24 LENIN, SOBRANIE SOCHINENII 337 (1955); 25 LENIN, SOBRANIE SOCHINENII 209
(1955); 35 LENIN, SOBRANIE SOCHINENII 251 (1955).
61. 26 LENIN, SOBRANIE SOCHINENII 223 (1955).
62. Id. at 386.
63. See, e.g., RAZDEL AZIATSKOI TURTSU (1924); KONSTANTINOPOL' I PROLIVY (vols. 1 &
2, 1925-1926); TSARSKAIA RoSSIA V MIROVOI VOINE (1925). The first two of these documents were published by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and the third by
the Central Archives of the USSR.
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repression." Less than a year later, the Georgian Government was
overthrown by the very Communist Party to which it had accorded
immunity in the secretly negotiated agreement. 4
An infamous example is the Secret Protocol to the Soviet-German
Treaty of Non-Aggression of 1939, which divided Eastern Europe into
Soviet and German spheres of influence.6 5 The consequences of this
Secret Protocol to this day continue to shape the political structure of
Europe. Further examples have been copiously documented by Triska
and Slusser in their in-depth study of Soviet treaty policy. 6
Presently, article 25 of the Law on the Procedure for the Conclusion, Execution and Denunciation of International Treaties provides
for publication of treaties concluded by the Soviet Government "upon
recommendation of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs."6 " Treaties
of an "interdepartmental character," on the other hand, are published
if and when the agency on whose initiative the treaty was concluded so
decides.6 " The government, therefore, is not limited by law, and may,
at its discretion, decide whether or not to publish a given treaty. Thus,
little is left of the principle proclaimed by Lenin in his Decree of Peace
almost seventy years ago.
V.

FEATURES OF THE AGREEMENTS

To place the agreements in a broader perspective, attention will
now be focused on some of the characteristics of the agreements which
64. See supra note 1; see also Slusser & Triska, Professor Krylov and Soviet Treaties, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 766, 767 (1957); cf. TaisKA & SLUSSER, supra note 39, at 374.
65. See supra note 2.
66. TRISKA & SLUSSER, supra note 39.
67. Law on the Procedure for the Conclusion, Execution and Denunciation of International Treaties, 17 I.L.M. 1115-22 (1978); see also TALALAEV, ZAKON, supra note 40, at
27-30.
68. Decree on the Procedure for the Conclusion, Execution and Denunciation of International Treaties of the USSR of an Interdepartmental Character, SP SSSR, supra
note 7 1980, No. 22, item 36, art. 13. See also Decree on the Procedure for the Publication and Entry into Force of Decrees and Regulations of the Government of the USSR,
Mar. 30, 1959, SP SSSR 1959 No. 6 item 37; for an English translation, see THE SOVIET
LEGAL SYSTEM: SELECTED CONTEMPORARY LEGISLATION AND DOCUMENTS 551-52 (W. Butler
trans. 1978). Article 4 of the 1959 decree stipulates that international agreements concluded by the USSR with foreign states "shall be published" in the SP SSSR "upon the
representation of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs." Id. For the right of the USSR
Council of Ministers to approve inter-governmental agreements, see art. 15 of the Law
on the USSR Council of Ministers, July 5, 1978, Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR, 1978 No. 28
item 436. For an English translation, see W. BUTLER, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON THE SOVIET
LEGAL SYSTEM 80, 86 (1983). See also N. MIRONOV, MEZHVEDOMSTVENNYE SVIAZI V USLOVIIAKH SOTSIALISTICHESKOI EKONOMICHESKOI INTEGRATISI: PRAVOVOI ASPEKT 31-32 (1973);
N. MIRONOV, supra note 39, at 13-37.
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raise far-reaching questions. Without going into the political framework of the agreements, 9 which is broad and complex, three law-related features are selected for discussion.
A.

Lack of Reciprocity

The Soviet Union agreed to deliver, free of charge, arms and
equipment valued at nearly twenty million rubles. The Soviet Government also agreed to bear the cost of training Grenadian servicemen in
the Soviet Union and of flying Soviet specialists to Grenada. The
equipment was to be delivered and the services rendered "at the request of the Government of Grenada." This is explicitly stated in the
Preambles and repeated in some of the substantive provisions of the
agreements. Apparently, the Soviet Government thought it essential to
go on record as a donor in its relations with Grenada. The agreements,
therefore, can be categorized as military aid rather than as commercial
transactions.
The Government of Grenada however, did undertake certain obligations with respect to receiving Soviet specialists in Grenadian territory. As noted previously, Grenada was obligated: to exempt the Soviet
specialists from taxation; to provide them with free medical services,
"comfortable furnished living accommodations," and free transportation facilities; and to ensure "meals at reasonable prices." The language used in the agreements reveals a concern on the part of the Soviet leadership that its specialists be treated in accordance with their
social status in a country which, in the Soviet view, might otherwise
not be willing or able to meet the standards of its guests. Cuba, on the
other hand, in its secret Protocol on Military Cooperation with Grenada, refrained from including provisions of a discriminatory nature."0
The Cubans, for instance, did not insist on "comfortable living accommodations" for their specialists.
Nonetheless, according to internal reports from the Grenadian
69. See J. Valenta & V. Valenta, Leninism in Grenada, 33 PROBS. OF COMMUNISM,
July-Aug. 1984, at 1; J. VALENTA & V. VALENTA, SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
(Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 184, 1984); GRENADA AND SOVIET/CUBAN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND

U.S./OECS

INTERVENTION (J.

Valenta & H. Ellison eds. 1986). See also HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SOVIET
POSTURE INTHE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, H.R. 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1985) (J. Valenta);
See also House of Commons FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, SECOND REPORT, GRENADA
(1984); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 669; SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (1985) (J. Michel).

70. GRENADA DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, Doc. 16-1. On the status of personnel from
Scandinavian countries under development agreements, cf. C. WIDSTRAND & Z. CERVENKA,
SCANDINAVIAN DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES 40-46 (1971).
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Embassy in Moscow to party and government leaders in St. George's,
Grenada recognized its weak bargaining position vis-&-vis the Soviet
the Soviet specialists the
Union, and, therefore, was willing to grant
71
privileged status sought by the Soviets.

B. Quid Pro Quo?
Rarely does any power provide free military aid to another state
without expecting something in return. 7 2 In this case, the Soviet Union
undertook to increase Grenada's military capabilities beyond its reasonable security needs. The Soviet motives for such an action cannot
be documented, but it stands to reason that the Soviet Union visualized the agreements as a means to promote its political and strategic
interests in not only the Caribbean basin, but also in the Western
Hemisphere as well. The Soviet Union apparently viewed Grenada as
an ally capable of furthering Soviet objectives in the region. Grenada,
under the NJM regime, had demonstrated its willingness to play such
a role-perhaps using Cuba as a model.
Also, the Soviet Union may have intended to make Grenada a
center of Soviet military presence in the area at some future date. In
such a case, the Soviet Union could secure access to naval and air facilities in the Caribbean basin and, thus, project her power into the
73
region.
C. Secrecy
The agreements do not indicate why they were classified "top secret." The obligations undertaken by the contracting parties, including
the supply of arms, the military training of foreign nationals and the
dispatch of military advisors, are not contrary to international law.
Nonetheless, two reasons suggest why these agreements were withheld
from the public. These reasons are suggested in internal documents of
the Soviet Union and Grenada.
First, a Soviet regulation listing subjects banned from open publication includes "[i]nformation on . . .free aid granted to other govern71.
72.

See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
On Soviet military assistance policy, see generally U.S.

ARMAMENT AGENCY, WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Dis(1985); Gu,

ARMS CONTROL AND

AND ARMS TRANSFERS

Soviet Arms Sales and Military Aid Policy in the Third World, 29 OSTEUROPA-WIRTSCHAFT
49 (1984); J. KRAUSE, SOWJETISCHE MILITARHILFE POLITIK GEGENOBER
ENTWICKLUNGSLANDERN (1985); M. SMITH, THE SOVIET ARMY 1939-1980 (1982).
73. Cf. HARKAVY, GREAT POWER COMPETITION FOR OVERSEAS BASES: THE GEOPOLITICS
OF ACCESS DIPLOMACY (1982)
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ments. ''74 Such information, if divulged, would demonstrate a lack of
reciprocity which, as shown above, is one of the features that characterizes the Soviet-Grenadian agreements. Soviet leaders consider it politically expedient to withhold data on aid given free of charge to other
countries because such aid is paid for by the labor of the population.
A second reason which might explain the secrecy of the agreements is linked to foreign policy considerations. Discussing ways and
means to enhance Grenada's role in the eyes of Soviet leaders, W.
Richard Jacobs, the Grenadian Ambassador to Moscow observed in
July, 1983, in a personal letter to Maurice Bishop, that "[t]o the extent
that we can take credit for bringing any other country into the progressive fold, our prestige and influence would be greatly enhansed [sic]."
Surinam was mentioned by the Ambassador as "the most likely candi1 If the Ambassador was correct in
date for special attention . . . . -.
his assessment, and if his remark reflected the thinking of the contracting parties at the time of the negotiations, the draftsmen had
every reason to hide the agreements from the outside world because
any use of the military capabilities provided under the agreements for
aggressive purposes would constitute a violation of international law.
VI.

POSTSCRIPT

In view of the turbulent events which followed the collapse of the
New JEWEL Movement in Grenada in 1983, it is intriguing to review
the fate of the dramatis personae who signed the three agreements
discussed in this article.
The 1980 Agreement was signed on behalf of Grenada by General
Hudson Austin, then the Minister of Defense and a member of the
NJM Politburo. In 1983, he not only accused Prime Minister Maurice
Bishop of "right opportunism," but he also demoted and ultimately
confined Bishop. Liberated by loyal supporters, Bishop was killed in a
clash with Grenadian armed forces using armored carriers supplied by
the Soviet Union. After the United States incursion into Grenada in
1983, Austin and others were charged with the murder of Maurice
Bishop and his supporters. Following a trial, Austin was sentenced to
death.76
The 1981 Protocol bears the signature of Major Basil H. Gahagan,
74.

V. CHALIDZE, LrrERATURNYE DELA KGB 152-55 (1976). The regulation was issued

for internal use only.
75. GRENADA DocUMENTs, supra note 3, Doc. 26-6; Introduction, 6.
76. GRENADA PAPERS, supra note 3, at 13, 238; MAURICE BISHOP SPEAKS, supra note
13, at XXVII; N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1984, at A3, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1984, N.Y.
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then the Deputy to the Chief of Staff of the People's Revolutionary
Army of Grenada. Subsequently, he was criticized for a "negative and
pessimistic attitude towards the work"" and, apparently, was removed
from his position. He did join the Revolutionary Military Council, however, which ruled Grenada for six days after Bishop was killed in
1983.78
The 1982 Agreement was signed by Lieutenant Colonel Liam
James as a representative of Grenada. James had been a student in the
Soviet Union and later became Minister of the Interior in Grenada and
Chief of Police and Intelligence Operations. A member of the NJM
Politburo, he figured prominently in the coup that overthrew Maurice
7
Bishop in 1983. Like Austin, he was sentenced to death in 1986. 1
The only person who signed the agreements on behalf of the Soviet Union and who could be identified by name was Colonel General
Mikhail Alekseevich Sergeichik. At the time he signed the 1982 Agreement, he was First Deputy Chairman of GKES. 80 Two years later, at
the age of 75, he was promoted to a ministerial position when he was
appointed Chairman of GKES. Thus, for Sergeichik, in contrast to his
Grenadian colleagues in the New JEWEL Movement, the secret Soviet-Grenadian military agreements have turned out to be a stepping
stone in his career."' In November, 1985, however, he was replaced by
Konstantin Katushev, who was then ,fifty eight years of age. He shares
this fate with other officials who under the new regime, have to yield
their positions to younger leaders. 8

77. Report of the International Relations Committee (IRC) of Oct. 12, 1982 submitted to the Organization Committee (OC) of the NJM, p.3. On file in the U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.
78. 3 COMMUNIST AFFAIRS 290, 295-96 (1984).
79. Id., Faerron, DrarnatisPersonae, CARRIBBEAN REV., July 1983, at 12; Diederich,
Interviewing George Louison, CARIBBEAN REV., July 1983, at 17, 18; see also Interview
with George Louison, Intercontinental Press, Apr. 16, 1984, at 208-10.
80. See supra note 43. M.A. Sergeichik, formerly Chief of the Main Engineering Department of GKES, became the First Deputy Chairman of GKES in 1979. See Izvestiia,

Nov. 4, 1984, English translation in 36
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81. Decree of 1984, SP SSSR, supra note 7, 1984 No. 35, item 193; Izvestiia, Nov. 4,
1984, supra note 80. Sergeichik, writing for Pravda in February 1985, was still identified
as GKES Chairman. See Pravda, February 1, 1985, English translation in REPRINTS
FROM THE SOVIET PRESS, Vol. 40, No. 4 (February 28, 1985) at 54-59.
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Radio Liberty Research (Munich), RL 421/85 of Dec. 10, 1985, at 7-8; E. TEAGUE, MORE
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